The EU in Antarctica: An Emerging Area of Interest, or Playing to the (Environmental) Gallery?

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Over the past decade, the EU has developed broader interests in the polar regions – ranging from fisheries, research and environmental protection to foreign affairs. Although this applies mainly to the Arctic region, its geographical opposite – the Antarctic – has not fallen into oblivion. This article explores the EU’s way ‘south’, examining its links to the region as well as the key drivers of this growing – albeit still limited – Antarctic engagement. International actions taken to establish Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) also indicate supranational tendencies to engage actively in and with Antarctic affairs. In particular, this concerns the European Commission and broader debates on sustainable development and global environmental leadership.

Keywords: European Union, Antarctic, Marine Protected Areas, Fisheries, Antarctic Treaty System

1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the EU and its various institutional actors have developed specific policies for geographical regions where the EU and its Member States hold interests. One example of this – driven by climate-change awareness, economic interests, geopolitical shifts and intra-institutional policy expansion – concerns the polar regions.

Despite several setbacks, these steps have been largely successful in the Arctic, with the EU having become an accepted partner at the Arctic governance table. However, compared to its fluid eastern and southern neighbourhoods, the Arctic and its regional layer – the European Arctic – are not key priority areas for the EU. They remain essentially a marginal note in EU foreign policy – a periphery on the periphery.¹

With the Arctic’s geographical opposite, Antarctica, there is even less engagement.² With most of its territory located in the Northern Hemisphere, EU

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2 Similarly, academia has rarely dealt with the EU’s approach towards Antarctica, with the recent exception of N. Liu, The European Union and the Establishment of Marine Protected Areas in Antarctica.
involvement in Antarctic governance is not self-evident.\textsuperscript{3} However, the Antarctic region and issues pertaining to it – particularly research, climate awareness and ocean governance – have slowly emerged on the policy agenda in Brussels in recent years. Moreover, as both EU citizens and Member States are involved in various activities in Antarctica, broader EU involvement may not be so unreasonable.\textsuperscript{4}

In this article, we explore and explain the EU’s role in Antarctica and its engagement with this peripheral part of the world, asking: what links the EU to Antarctica? and what drives the EU and some of its Member States to become more relevant Antarctic actors?\textsuperscript{2}

From the extensive literature on the EU as an actor – or self-proclaimed leader – in international environmental and climate debates,\textsuperscript{5} as well on its engagement with the Arctic region over the past decade, we can extrapolate a few basic starting points for further examination.

First, EU policies directly affecting Antarctica are largely promoted and decided by a few Member States with specific Antarctic interests. Those that claim territory in Antarctica are the starting points for our enquiry. Second, initiatives such as the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) derive from specific interests amongst certain actors in the EU system who deem it advantageous to pursue them through related policies. Third, policies are the outcome of intra-institutional goals and strategies in the EU system aimed at signalling environmental leadership to EUropean and international audiences.

To answer the two questions noted above, we first explore these three simplified conceptions of the EU policymaking system by offering a broad overview of the EU’s relations to Antarctica, as a geographic area and as a policy issue. This includes several specific policy links to Antarctic-relevant issue areas with exclusive or shared competences for the EU, such as environmental protection, climate change, research, tourism, and fishing.

\textsuperscript{2} Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 271.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., at 271.
We then evaluate the prospects of greater EU involvement in Antarctic affairs against the EU’s ‘gateways to Antarctica’. Only after these largely descriptive questions are answered can more theoretically focused research be conducted, for example on EU governance approaches beyond its geographical or jurisdictional borders.

Our analysis draws on a comprehensive review of EU policy documents and policy history concerning Antarctica, complemented by interviews conducted with all relevant branches of the EU system in Brussels in February and November 2018. We focused on officials in the European Commission (hereinafter ‘Commission’) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), politicians and staff-members in the European Parliament (EP), and EU Member State officials dealing with Antarctic issues.

In total, we conducted seven semi-formal interviews, re-visiting some of the same central actors across the two timeframes outlined. However, as some interviewees insisted on anonymity, we decided to use this material only sparingly, combining it with document analysis of relevant material as well as previous scholarship on the topic. Our aim is to identify some mechanisms that have led the EU to engage in Antarctic affairs, as well as the motivating factors involved.

2 THE FORGOTTEN CONTINENT

With the Arctic re-appearing on the international radar about a decade ago, also its southern counterpart has occasionally made the news. However, despite some similarities regarding extreme weather and climatic conditions, and the effects of darkness during winter and full daylight during summer, the Antarctic is quite different from the Arctic.

First and foremost, the Antarctic is a continent, with most of its territory falling within the Antarctic Circle, see Figure 1.6 Legally, the spatial extent of the Antarctic regime is specified by the Antarctic Treaty, which defines its operational area to be south of 60°S.7 Further, unlike the Arctic, the Antarctic has no history of supporting human populations, and no indigenous people.8 Basically, whereas the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by sovereign countries, Antarctica is a landmass not officially belonging to any country, surrounded by oceans.

The first claims to the Antarctic landmass arose already in 1840, when the French expedition of Jules Dumont d’Urville claimed Terre Adélie – a relatively small slice of the Antarctic ‘pie’. Romantic idealization of the region contributed to initial notions of the ‘Explorer’ and the ‘Adventurer’ where mankind (read: men)

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at the turn of the nineteenth century would ‘prove themselves’. The (in)famous race for the geographic South Pole was concluded in 1911, with the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen becoming the first to reach that point, followed a month later by the British Robert F. Scott, who perished on the return journey.

Figure 1  Major Geographical Features of Antarctica

Source: Wikimedia.

9 Ibid., at 38.
Marine living resources were the impetus for more substantial European interest in the area: whaling was expanding in the south, as stocks closer to home were becoming depleted. In the first half of the twentieth century, claims to Antarctica multiplied, as *terra nullius* could be claimed simply by a formal expression of intention to occupy the land, combined with demonstration of effective occupation. Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK all followed this approach in the 1920s and 1930s, alongside the unrecognized claim by Nazi Germany to New Swabia (within the Norwegian claim in Queen Maud Land) in 1939.

In addition, Argentina and Chile claimed Antarctic territory as a *natural* extension of their own southern territories, disparaging other claims in the area as expressions of Western imperialism. They held that their claims were ‘inherited rather than something that had to be formally claimed and occupied’, and even linked to their inheritance of Spanish territorial rights granted by a papal bull in 1493.

Finally, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) began to engage in Antarctic (geo)politics: the region was relevant to the great-power politics of the two superpowers in the early years of the Cold War. Spurred by fears that the area could be utilized for military purposes and that access could be restricted, the USA took the lead in efforts for an international governance framework for Antarctica in the late 1950s.

The establishment of a distinct Antarctic governance regime dates back to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty, adopted in December 1959 as a result of the Washington Conference on Antarctica. This occurred at a peak time of the Cold War – and yet, both the USA and the USSR agreed on the need to balance ‘a wide range of issues including the status of sovereign claims over the continent and its demilitarization’. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was signed by twelve states with declared claims or interests in Antarctica: the seven territorial claimants, as well as Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the USA and the USSR.

Although it was negotiated by twelve states with significant interests in the continent at the time, the Antarctic Treaty is an open regime: any state with a demonstrated interest in Antarctica may join. Today, the Treaty has been acceded to by fifty-four countries. Limiting the designs of the two superpowers

15 Stephens, *supra* n. 6, at 344.
within the area, the Antarctic Treaty also ‘froze’ the territorial, and subsequently maritime, claims of the seven Antarctic claimant states.\textsuperscript{17} The main purpose of the Antarctic Treaty has been to ensure ‘in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord’.\textsuperscript{18} Further, the Antarctic Treaty has become the basis of a wider Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) that governs the entire area.

The ATS is based on a set of binding international agreements to which all contracting parties are legally committed.\textsuperscript{19} It comprises the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR Convention), the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, and the measures in effect under these instruments.\textsuperscript{20} Today, the ATS is widely recognized as a success story in international law and diplomacy, addressing questions of demilitarization, scientific research, environmental protection and marine resources.\textsuperscript{21}

3 THE EUROPEAN UNION’S GATEWAYS TO ANTARCTICA

3.1 LEGAL CONNECTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ANTARCTIC SET-UP

In general, the EU treaties serve as the legal basis for any EU policy action. The most recent modification to the EU’s founding treaties is the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amended both the Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), the latter renamed in Lisbon as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

\textsuperscript{17} Despite their territorial claims being frozen, all seven states have made submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in order to extend their maritime zones, see Wehrmann, \textit{supra} n. 14, at 46. Neither the USSR nor the USA has recognized the territorial claims put forward and thus officially accepted the division of Antarctica into sectors, see \textit{Ibid.}, at 57. However, neither had made a claim to Antarctic sovereignty, ‘only’ reserving the right to do so in the future, see G. Triggs, \textit{The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and Cooperation}, in \textit{Science Diplomacy: Science, Antarctica, and the Governance of International Spaces} 39–49, 41 (P. A. Berkman et al., eds, Smithsonian Institute 2011). When adopted, the Antarctic Treaty, Art. IV, stated that ‘[n]o new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force’, see \textit{The Antarctic Treaty, supra} n. 7.

\textsuperscript{18} Wehrmann, \textit{supra} n. 14 at 58.

\textsuperscript{19} Liu, \textit{supra} n. 2 at 863.

The Lisbon Treaty clarifies the EU’s legal competences, specifying them as exclusive, shared, and complementary. Conferred exclusive competence in a specific policy area, for example the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), empowers the EU with sole competence to legislate and adopt legally binding acts (TFEU, Article 2 and 3). The general rule is, however, that the EU can exercise such competence – internally or externally – only if this is conferred by its Member States. Thus, competence may also be shared, enabling both the EU and the Member States to enact legal instruments, for example regarding environmental policies, energy or transport issues (TFEU, Article 2 and 4).

In the context of the EU’s external relations, the question of external competence and legitimacy is of significant importance as it deals with the question of who is eventually authorized to act externally – the EU, its Member States, or together as a joint effort?22

What does this legal point of departure mean for EU action in and around the Antarctic continent? The EU’s exclusive competence – internally and externally – with regard to the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP, but also to common commercial policy, offers an obvious gateway for EU involvement in Antarctic governance.23 Generally, the international framework for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources is spread across a range of legal instruments, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); with the EU as a contracting party to both.24

Although the ATS is an open regime, allowing any state to join at any given time, it is essentially restricted to states only. This means that the EU cannot become a contracting party to ATS instruments, but is only ‘represented’ via its Member States.25 Commission representatives were granted observer status to four special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) during the negotiations of the Environmental Protocol in the early 1990s.26 The EU is, however, a contracting party to the CAMLR Convention, together with ten Member States: Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden.

23 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2 at 272.
24 Liu, supra n. 2 at 863.
25 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2 at 271.
26 Ibid., at 273.
3.2 Southern history and European Antarctic Activities

The EU has ‘engaged only (very) limitedly in Antarctic governance’, although nineteen of its current twenty-seven Member States are party to the Antarctic Treaty: eleven as consultative treaty parties and eight as non-consultative treaty parties. Moreover, Belgium was one of the twelve original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, France still retains sovereignty claims over Terre Adélie, as does the UK (as former EU Member State) over its British Antarctic Territory.

The region was of interest for the European Community during the 1980s and early 1990s, when the ‘Question of Antarctica’ was put on the UN General Assembly agenda, but institutional European attention receded shortly after. At the time, debates had mainly concerned Antarctic environmental protection issues, particularly within the context of developing the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), a part of the ATS regime that was signed in 1988 but never entered into force.

Table 1 provides an overview – a non-exclusive list of documents concerning Antarctica in recent decades. In 1979, the Commission issued a Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Community for the establishment of a convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources: this resulted in the 1980 CAMLR Convention. The recommendation highlighted not only the interest of some (then) Member States (predominantly Belgium, France and the UK) in the exploitation of living resources but also the Community’s own interests in participating in the negotiations for such a convention.

The EU position on matters dealt by the CAMLR Convention is set out in multiannual positions, adopted by the Council for five-year periods, as highlighted

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27 Ibid.
28 The eleven states are Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. The eight non-consultative parties are Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia.
29 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2 at 271. The French Antarctic territories, les terres australes et antarctiques françaises, are a territoire d’outre-mer – an autonomous entity: in EU terms, an overseas territory. As such Terre Adélie is not governed by the aquis communautaire, allowing France to, inter alia, circumvent the EU’s exclusive competence with regard to marine biological resources conservation.
30 Ibid., at 274.
32 Wehrmann, supra n. 14, at 60.
in the three most recent documents since 2009. In 1987, the EP adopted two resolutions on the economic and ecological significance of the region, after related motions dating back to 1984.34 The 1987 resolutions held that the Community should participate in its own right in decision-making concerning Antarctica.35 Since then, the Commission has issued several proposals for Council Regulations, with conservation and control measures applicable to fishing activities in the Antarctic.

Table 1  Talking About the South – European Institutions Discovering Antarctica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the Community for the establishment of a convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources</td>
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34 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 280.
35 Idiens, supra n. 31, at 93.

2009 Council Decision on the establishment of the Community position to be adopted in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 13908/1/09 REV 1, 13 October 2009

2014 Council Decision on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union, in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 10840/14, 11 June 2014

2019 Council Decision (EU) 2019/867 of 14 May 2019 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and repealing the Decision of 24 June 2014 on the position to be adopted, on behalf of the Union, in the CCAMLR (Official Journal of the European Union of 28 May 2019 L 140/72)

Source: own compilation

And yet, despite limited institutional engagement with the region over the past decades, the EU, its Member States and also its citizens are not unfamiliar with the continent and its surrounding waters. As conclusively elaborated by Vanstappen and Wouters, the EU and its Member States/citizens are involved in several key activities in and for the region – not least, in scientific research, fisheries and tourism.\(^{36}\)

In 2019, the European Polar Board (EPB) listed thirty-two European facilities in the Antarctic: eleven year-round and eleven seasonal stations, five seasonal camps, two seasonal laboratories and three seasonal shelters. Today, seven of these facilities are operated by two non-EU Member States, Norway and the UK. Out of the sixteen European research vessels that operate regularly in the polar regions, six are non-EU; in addition, the German Alfred Wegener Institute deploys a polar aircraft fleet.\(^{37}\)

In recent decades, and under the EU’s multiannual Framework Programmes (FPs) for Research and Technological Development (from FP5 up to the current Horizon2020), the EU and its Member States have been major financial contributors to international research activities and the

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\(^{36}\) Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 271.

development of polar research infrastructure, some with a distinct Antarctic dimension.38 Since 2015, an EU-funded consortium – EU-PolarNet – has worked to improve the coordination between twenty-two European polar research institutions from seventeen countries (including Norway and the UK), among others also the EPB.39

In terms of economic activity, marine resource extraction dominates. The revenues of Antarctic fisheries mainly derive from two main targeted species – the Patagonian and Antarctic toothfish, and krill.40 Fisheries in the Southern Ocean do not differ from areas elsewhere. Moreover, the conditions, like extreme sea and weather circumstances, are rather similar to those in the ocean’s northern counterpart.

From 2002 to 2012, EU Member States caught approximately 170,000 tonnes of fish, constituting some 9.5% of the total catch quota during this period.41 From 2008 to 2012, five EU Member States – Germany, France, Poland, Spain and the UK – caught approximately 120,000 tonnes of fish.42 However, catches from France (and the UK) are not included under the EU’s overall quota, as these catches fall under their own sovereignty of their Antarctic territories.43 They retain full competence, also with regard to the conservation of marine biological resources (see section 3.3).44 Thus, actual EU catches for 2008–2018 were only a fraction of the indicated 120,000 tonnes: 46 tonnes for Germany (2011/12), 18,188 tonnes for Poland (2008–2011) and 5,847 tonnes for Spain (2008–2018).45

For the most recent fisheries season – 1 December 2018–30 November 2019 – France, Spain and the UK granted fishing licences to six vessels. Over the past decade, both the involved Member States as well as the number of fishing vessels remained basically unchanged. Also, for the authorization period 1 December 2019 to 31 November 2020, France, Spain (and the UK as non-EU

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41 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 272.
44 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 274.
45 CCAMLR, supra n. 42.
Member State from 1 February 2020 onwards) have issued fishing licences to five vessels.\footnote{See, \url{https://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/authorised-vessels} (accessed 31 May 2020).}

EUropean citizens have been well represented the numbers of tourists visiting Antarctic. For 2014–2015, Vanstappen and Wouters reported a total of 9,886 tourists from EU Member States, of a total of 36,686 tourists.\footnote{Vanstappen & Wouters, \textit{supra} n. 2, at 272.} Similar figures can be observed for subsequent years, with some 9,700 tourists coming from three EU countries – Germany, France and the UK – in 2018–2019.\footnote{See, \url{https://iaato.org/tourism-statistics} (accessed 28 May 2020).}

In today’s globalized world, these linkages between EUrope and Antarctica are hardly surprising, even regarding a region most EUropeans think of mostly in terms of penguins, Japanese whaling efforts and accounts of the race between Amundsen and Scott. We ask: from a political (and economic) perspective, what are the driving forces of the EU as an Antarctic actor? As convincingly argued by Vanstappen and Wouters, ‘legal competences matters’, especially with regard to the EU’s external actions and the related interplay between the EU and its Member States, also concerning questions of Antarctic governance and the EU’s potential involvement.\footnote{Vanstappen & Wouters, \textit{supra} n. 2, at 272.}

3.3 Establishing Marine Protected Areas

Despite the efforts outlined above, in recent decades EU institutions have shown scant interest in Antarctic affairs and related governance structures, as also reflected in the EU’s internal organizational structure.\footnote{Ibid.} Within the Commission, it is essentially only its Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs (DG MARE) that is concerned with Antarctic issues, and this in relation to the participation in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) – the CAMLR Convention’s main regulatory body.

In addition to the Commission, which represents the EU, also eight Member States are currently members of CCAMRL, making EUrope’s engagement within CCARML a case of mixed representation.\footnote{Ibid.} No ‘Antarctic desk’ exists within the EEAS, although the Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic also – to a certain extent – deals with the Antarctic dimensions. As one of the interviewees

\footnote{Ibid. The eight Member States are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden.}
highlights, the Antarctic has only spurred EEAS-in-house involvement since 2017, when its Delegation to Australia inquired on the Union’s general position on Antarctic.  

One area that has received considerable attention in Antarctic governance and resource debates, and where the EU itself has been engaged, has been the establishment of MPAs — marine protected areas. MPAs arose as a concept for the protection of certain sensitive maritime domains, although at its core an ‘MPA is nothing more than a particular management strategy applied in a defined area’. However, since the early 2000s, this particular form of ocean management has become a staple of many countries’ attempts at improving zonal regulations and the governance of ocean areas.

In the Antarctic, CCAMLR was established with the objective of conserving marine life, and in response to increasing commercial interest in Antarctic krill resources and the history of over-exploitation of several other marine resources in the Southern Ocean. Today, CCAMLR has twenty-six members, including the EU, and is headquartered in Tasmania, Australia. Its members ‘continuously update conservation measures that determine the use of marine living resources in the Antarctic’, with related decisions based on consensus. However, the limitations of this structural set-up have become clear in connection with efforts to establish MPAs in waters surrounding the continent, see Figure 2. According to CCAMLR:

MPAs do not necessarily exclude fishing, research or other human activities; in fact, many MPAs are multi-purpose areas. MPAs in which no fishing is allowed are often referred to as ‘no-take areas’. Other uses may still be permitted.

Starting in 2009, the UK proposed a South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf MPA to CCAMLR. Although parts of it to the north had to be removed, it met little opposition amongst the members. Establishing this MPA was seen as the first step in a larger connected effort to establish a series of MPAs.

52 Also, Chile has indicated its interest in including Antarctica in discussions concerning the update of the existing 2002 EU–Chile Association Agreement: Interview 1 with EEAS Official, European External Action Service (Brussels 26 Nov. 2018).
55 Wehrmann, supra n. 14, at 60.
across Antarctic waters, following the more general UN recommendations on MPAs.

In 2011, New Zealand and the USA proposed another MPA in the Ross Sea.59 At the same time, proposals for the East Antarctic and the Weddell Sea were being deliberated. Concerning East Antarctica, Australia, France and the EU took the initiative,60 whereas the EU and the UK were developing a proposal regarding the Weddell Sea.61 The resultant Weddell Sea MPA covers 1.8 million km$^2$ in a remote, ice-covered part east of the Antarctic Peninsula.62 These suggestions met with fierce resistance, especially from China and Russia,63 concerning possible limitations on local fisheries – prompting the question of ‘whether national economic incentives in the Southern Ocean are now overwhelming science and conservation values’.64

In 2016, after five consecutive years of China and Russia blocking the proposal,65 the members of CCAMLR finally agreed on the Ross Sea MPA, which entered into effect in December 2017. At 1.55 million km$^2$, it has been hailed as the world’s largest MPA, although, as put by Rothwell: ‘the length of time taken to reach consensus on the proposal highlighted differences of views amongst member states and it remains to be seen whether CCAMLR members will be supportive of similar initiatives in other parts of the Southern Ocean’.66 The East Antarctica and the Weddell Sea proposals, however, have still not been affirmed, despite continued efforts by the proposers to reach a joint agreement.67 In addition, other parts of Antarctic waters, like the Antarctic Peninsula region, are under consideration for the establishment of MPAs.

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61 Brooks, supra n. 59, at 285.
62 Liu, supra n. 2 at 868.
64 Brooks, supra n. 59, at 278.
65 Bray, supra n. 12, at 263.
66 Rothwell, supra n. 59 at 279.
It seems clear – as also affirmed by our interviews – that the issue of establishing MPAs is not only an important dimension regarding the EU’s Antarctic involvement, but also one that prompts further EU engagement with the southern region. However, this seems to relate to the engagement of one specific unit within DG MARE only, which links the establishment of Antarctic MPAs with the EU’s global targets of having 10% of marine areas protected by 2020. Antarctica is seen as one area that could help the EU to

68 Liu, supra n. 2 at 867–868.
achieve its 10% target by implementing large MPAs in waters where there is little or no economic activity, and thus few objecting interests.\footnote{Interview with Commission Official, supra n. 69.}

In consequence, in these processes the Commission has been a fairly active proponent of establishing MPAs. As put by Liu: ‘The EU and its Member States have been driving initiatives on the establishment of MPAs in the Southern Ocean over the past decade’.\footnote{Liu, supra n. 2 at 867.} This has also become apparent in the reports from the annual CCAMLR meetings, where the EU has used strong language in support of its MPA efforts. Regarding the East Antarctic MPA (EAMPA), the EU stated in 2018:

The EU and its member States note with regret that this is the seventh consecutive year that the EAMPA proposal has been discussed without result. The proposal was first tabled in 2012 and has been changed several times since then to accommodate concerns raised by other Members. (...) Considering that the Scientific Committee considered already in 2013 that the proposal is based on best available science, the EU and its member States cannot accept that new demands for more scientific work are being made by some delegations year after year.\footnote{CCAMLR, Report of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Commission (Hobart, Australia, 22 Oct. – 2 Nov. 2018), 26 (2018), https://www.ccamlr.org/en/meetings/27 (last accessed 1 Jan. 2020).}

Further, regarding the Weddell Sea MPA (WSMPA):

The EU and its member States indicated their willingness to work closely and constructively with Norway and other CCAMLR Members to explore options that could facilitate the rapid adoption of the WSMPA proposal at the next annual meeting.\footnote{Ibid., at 28.}

And:

The EU and its member States wish to express profound disappointment at the failure to make significant progress this year on the proposal regarding a MPA in the Weddell Sea.\footnote{Ibid., at 29.}

The role of the Commission, and DG MARE in particular, is further underscored in arguments on legal competence between the Commission and the Council/Member States concerning which institution has legislative authority (competence) regarding MPAs. The Commission held that it had exclusive competence, as MPAs are measures for the conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP.\footnote{Interview with Commission Official, supra n. 69.} However, the Council insisted that measures to protect the marine environment were a matter of environmental policies, and thus, as a shared competence, any future proposals for all three Antarctic MPAs (East Antarctic, Ross Sea and Weddell Sea) should be submitted on behalf of both the EU and its Member

\footnote{Interview with Commission Official, supra n. 69.}
States. The Commission challenged this view and brought two cases (C-625/15 and C-659/16) against the Council before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in order to annul two decisions adopted by the Council in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

On 20 November 2018, the CJEU ruled in favour of the Council/Member States, holding that, as protection of the environment is the main purpose of an MPA, the contested decisions fell, not within the exclusive competence of the EU, but within the competence regarding protection of the environment that the EU shares with the Member States (‘shared competences’). That decision gives Member States further leverage in what has become an internal political and legal tug-of-war of shared competences and mixed action.

However, concerning Antarctica, all the (then) Member States with an active interest – Germany, France and the UK – have been supportive of pressing for MPAs in Antarctica. As one Norwegian representative remarked: ‘Weddell Sea has become the baby of Germany’ – that is, German interest in developing a Weddell Sea MPA has been instrumental in driving the EU’s interest in, and engagement with, the matter. Thus, as pointed out in a 2018 EP Q&A-session on MPAs directed at the Commission, the ‘establishment of a representative system of Marine Protected Areas is a priority for the EU’.

Asked why Antarctica was singled out regarding MPAs, one interviewee admitted frankly: ‘in Antarctica, there is less public opposition’.

4 THE FUTURE OF THE EU’S ANTARCTIC POLICY: FISHERIES MEET ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS

As yet, Antarctica – the world’s southernmost continent – has not necessarily come to the fore of EU policymaker agendas; with a few exceptions, broader environmental considerations, research efforts and economic activities have occasionally led Europeans to look southwards. Accordingly, Vanstappen and Wouters concluded in 2017 that the EU/Commission is currently lacking any ambition and

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77 Liu, supra n. 2 at 865.
80 Interview with Policy Officer, Mission of Norway to the EU (Brussels 27 Nov. 2018).
82 Interview with Commission Official, supra n. 69.
interest to engage further in the region, especially with regard to the ATS. This is not only because of the continent’s low visibility in global politics and the lack of a ‘proper’ international crisis in and around the region, but also has an inherent EU-internal aspect: the tendency of some Member States to guard what they consider their sovereign domain.

This becomes obvious when we view the EU’s Antarctic case from the triple perspective of ocean resources (= fisheries), environmental governance (= MPAs) and foreign policy. Today, the EU is a global player in the development of international fisheries law and multilateral fisheries governance, and a key factor in international fisheries management. The EU’s external fleet represents about a quarter of total EU fleet capacity, and provides over a quarter of the EU’s total catches. A member of fourteen out of eighteen regional fisheries management organizations globally, the EU has also concluded various bilateral agreements with third countries, of reciprocal or compensatory nature.

One issue that comes to fore in the foreign policy–fisheries policy nexus is that of sustainable development, where the EU has shown considerable ambitions in recent decades to assert influence. Especially the CFP’s external dimensions have been criticized for deviating from the basic principles of sustainability and precaution. A core component of EU climate and growth initiatives, its external fisheries policies have directly contradicted this goal at times. Bretherton and Vogler concluded that the external dimension of fisheries is inherently determined by the fundamental contradiction ‘between the needs and demands of the EU-based fishing industry and its customers, and the sustainable development objectives of the Union’.

The distinction between foreign and fisheries policies is further blurred because the use of foreign policy tools is essential for developing successful policies.

83 Vanstappen & Wouters, supra n. 2, at 277.
86 Ibid., at 404.
87 Belschner, supra n. 85 at 986.
90 Bretherton & Vogler, supra n. 5 at 414.
for trade and the environment.\footnote{A. Østhagen, Utenrikspolitisk entreprenørskap: EU og utviklingen av en Arktis-politikk, 69 Int’l Pol. 7–35 (2011).} This helps to explain the apparent paradoxes in EU foreign policy making. In the Arctic, the influence of limited fishing interests and their ability to ‘hijack’ larger foreign policy issues is beyond doubt. The EU’s global fisheries activities have thus at times contradicted the ‘declared support for the norms of sustainable development’.\footnote{Bretherton & Vogler, supra n. 5 at 408.}

However, in the case of Antarctica, these findings are reversed: environmental concerns override those of fisheries. Naturally, the weighting of these issues is dependent on the size of EU Antarctica fisheries, which have been rather limited. Furthermore, and as highlighted by interviewees, in a narrow and specific issue such as this, the influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – in this case the Antarctic Ocean Alliance, which is also a CCAMLR observer – has had considerable influence when the EU was formulating its position, through campaigns such as a petition to call on CCAMLR to establish a large-scale network of MPAs; this petition gathered more than 200,000 signatures.\footnote{Interview with Ambassador-at-Large for the Arctic, European External Action Service (Brussels 26 Nov. 2018); Interview with Policy Officer, supra n. 80; see also, \url{http://www.thelastoceangfilm.com/sign-the-aoa-petition} (accessed 28 My 2020).}

We also see a contrast between the EU’s/Commission’s engagement in the ATS in general, which is characterized as limited, in contrast to its activity in CCAMLR.\footnote{Vanstappen \& Wouters, supra n. 2 at 275.} This is as much a result of the internal balancing in Brussels, as of the lack of specific goals among EU actors: ‘it is clear that the EU’s Member States prefer the Union not to encroach on what they consider their sovereign domain. It is therefore unlikely that the EU’s relationship to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) will change anytime soon’.\footnote{Vanstappen, supra n. 84.}

This study has shown that, as regards Antarctica, the EU’s approach is not driven by one coherent approach or framework, but is dominated by limited issue-engagement in a domain where benefits – at least symbolic ones – can be reaped. With limited fisheries activity and little interest beyond national research initiatives, action on MPAs has become an area where the EU can maintain its image as a forerunner in environmental policies – even though these waters are probably the farthest from EUropean waters as is possible to go.

Placing these findings in the wider context of EU ‘actorness’ and policy-making, we see that the EU has multiple interests and voices when formulating geographically-focused policies – even within policy domains such as fisheries, where the Member States have ceded competence and authority to the...
supranational level. On the one hand, Member States and their fishers are keen to exploit economic opportunities, no matter how relatively minor in comparison with fisheries elsewhere or other economic activities. On the other hand, the Commission/EEAS actively promote the principles of sustainable management and precaution regarding marine living resources. Thus, the two positions that ‘the EU’ holds here – one specific and one general – contradict each other and reveal the EU’s multi-headed nature on issues such as these.

Further, EU politics are more concerned with practices in various locations (physical as well as competence-related) than involving a set of universal principles and traditional anchored power politics. The EU’s Antarctic approach has in many ways been that of a ‘geopolitical’ actor in terms of environmental policies – pursuing certain policy-interests in a geographically defined space of growing relevance. However, the EU’s sui generis policy-making system has also produced an intra-institutional Antarctic ‘policy’ better suited for internal than external purposes: it showcases how the Commission in particular is fulfilling its goal of protecting maritime domains.

Despite the EU’s insistence and relatively concurrent push for the MPA issue around Antarctica, other actors – notably China, Russia and to some extent Norway – have been sceptical to new protected areas. Not only do differences in regulatory and management approaches enter the picture (as in the case of Norway): also, economic interests and geopolitical rivalries have become more pronounced on this issue in recent years.

Here the EU also finds itself embroiled in a (geo)political rivalry focused on Antarctica, where the clash of interests – economic vs. environmental – seems set to increase. Already in 2017 and 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the Antarctic, and, at a speech in Malta in 2017, then High Representative Federica Mogherini highlighted EU and Australian efforts concerning MPAs as a sign of the EU’s increasing global role.

With the new von der Leyen Commission launching ‘The European Green Deal’ in December 2019, both MPAs and the global catchphrase ‘blue economy/growth’ received further attention, as measures under this broad new framework. Here, the Antarctic’s rather untouched waters will probably figure in DG MARE’s continued green-blue nexus. Moreover, the Commission has

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97 Raspotnik, supra n. 1.
98 Interview 1 with EEAS Official, supra n. 52.
expressed a desire to advance the EU’s geopolitical role in effect balancing against the decisions taken in Moscow, Beijing and even Washington, DC. With the emphasis on a so-called ‘Geopolitical Commission’, EU engagement in environmental affairs in Antarctica might also rise higher on Brussels’ agenda, albeit from a very low starting point.

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